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1TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Braxton Smith )    Docket No. 2019-03-0016
) 
v. )    State File No. 30371-2018
) 
Galloway Construction, LLC, et al. ) 
) 
) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Pamela B. Johnson, Judge ) 
Affirmed and Remanded
The employee, a lineman, was injured when a pole fell from a trailer and struck him on 
the back, causing him to fall and hit his head.  The employer provided medical treatment 
for the employee’s back injury but denied that his complaints of headaches were causally 
related to the work accident.  The trial court found the employee was entitled to a panel 
of neurologists for evaluation and treatment of his headaches. The employer has 
appealed.  We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.
Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in 
which Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.
Christopher R. Brooks and Kristi M. Pickens, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-
appellant, Galloway Construction, LLC
Ameesh Kherani, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Braxton Smith
Factual and Procedural Background
Braxton Smith (“Employee”) was working for Galloway Construction, LLC 
(“Employer”), loading telephone poles onto a trailer when one of the poles fell from the 
trailer and struck Employee in the back on April 25, 2018.  As a result, Employee was 
knocked into the truck to which the trailer was attached and hit his head.  He sought 
treatment at Cumberland Medical Center’s emergency room where he complained of low 
back pain and headaches.  X-rays of his back did not reveal any fractures, and a CT scan 
of his head was normal.  Employee was diagnosed with contusions to his back and head.
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2Employee continued to complain of back pain as a result of the accident, and 
Employer provided authorized medical treatment, first at Morgan County Medical Center 
and then with Dr. Paul Johnson.  Dr. Johnson first saw Employee on May 17, 2018, and 
recommended conservative care for Employee’s back complaints.  When Employee’s 
back complaints did not resolve over the course of several months, Dr. Johnson 
performed surgery.  Employee saw Dr. Johnson for post-surgical follow up in October 
and November 2018.
On December 21, 2018, Employee saw Dr. Johnson and complained of headaches.
Dr. Johnson noted that Employee “states that he has been having headaches all along 
since the time of his injury.”  Dr. Johnson stated that the headaches were not related to 
the back injury and, as such, were outside the scope of his practice.  He concluded that if 
Employee “in fact relates this to his job-related injury, I feel it is [the] compensation 
carrier’s responsibility to refer him to see someone.”  Dr. Johnson placed Employee at 
maximum medical improvement with respect to his back injury on February 1, 2019.
At some point, Employer sought a records review from a Dr. Robert Greenberg.  
Dr. Greenberg is not further identified, and any report he may have provided is not in the 
record.  However, Employer referenced Dr. Greenberg’s opinion in a written inquiry it 
sent to Dr. Johnson regarding the cause of Employee’s headaches.  The questionnaire 
asked whether Dr. Johnson agreed with Dr. Greenberg’s opinion that Employee’s 
headaches were less than 50% causally related to the work accident, and Dr. Johnson 
answered in the affirmative.
Employee sought an evaluation with Dr. Choudhury Salekin, who opined that 
Employee had “[p]ost-traumatic headache as a complication of closed head injury 
sustained during the incident at work on 4-25-18.”  Dr. Salekin also completed a Standard 
Form Medical Report (“Form C-32”) that likewise indicated Employee’s headaches were 
causally related to the work accident.
Employer obtained a second records review from Dr. David Hauge, who opined 
that Employee’s headaches were not causally related to his work accident.  Dr. Hauge 
noted that, while there was a complaint of headaches on the day of the accident, there 
were no further complaints until December 2018.  He stated that “in [his] medical 
judgment and in the absence of any contradictory history the patient’s onset of headache
in [sic] December 21, 2018 would not be post[-]traumatic headache and would not be 
referable to the April 25, 2018 work accident.”
Following the issuance of a dispute certification notice, Employee filed a request 
for an expedited hearing that identified Dr. Salekin as a witness “[v]ia C-
32.” Employee’s request for a hearing was accompanied by his affidavit but did not 
include any medical records or the Form C-32. Employee requested that the trial judge 
issue a decision on the record instead of convening an evidentiary hearing.
3Employer filed an objection to the use of Dr. Salekin’s C-32 in lieu of a deposition 
as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235(c)(2) and advised of its intent 
to schedule his deposition. Employer also objected to Employee’s request for a decision 
on the record and requested an evidentiary hearing. In support of its objection, Employer 
asserted that Dr. Johnson had expressed the opinion that Employee’s complaints of 
headaches were “less than 50% causally related” to the work accident and attached Dr. 
Johnson’s records as an exhibit to its response. In addition, Employer’s response noted 
that Dr. Salekin had evaluated Employee and that Employee had “implied that he intends 
to enter Dr. Salekin’s medical findings as proof via C-32.” The response noted 
Employer’s objection to the use of Dr. Salekin’s C-32, stating that Employer planned to 
depose Dr. Salekin.
Although the record on appeal does not include an order addressing Employee’s 
request for a decision on the record, it is apparent the trial court denied the request, as it 
scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Approximately one month after Employer filed its 
response to Employee’s request for a decision on the record, Employer filed its pre-
hearing brief and witness and exhibit lists. Employer submitted numerous exhibits, 
including medical records of Employee’s treatment, as well as Dr. Salekin’s report and 
Form C-32. Employer’s list of exhibits included “[a]ny and all documents and pleadings 
filed . . . along with attachments or exhibits to those documents and pleadings.” It also 
included “any and all medical records or evaluations regarding the Employee.”
Employee did not file a pre-hearing brief or a list of exhibits.
At the expedited hearing, Employee testified that Dr. Johnson’s records were
silent with respect to complaints of headaches because Employee knew Dr. Johnson was 
only treating his back complaints.  He stated that his headaches had been consistently 
present since the accident, but that he saw no reason to discuss them with a physician 
who would not address them.
The trial court found Employee had presented sufficient evidence to establish he 
would likely prevail at trial in proving he was entitled to a panel of physicians for his 
headaches.  In reaching that conclusion, the court admitted Dr. Salekin’s C-32 over 
Employer’s objection and gave Dr. Salekin’s opinion greater weight than that of Dr. 
Hauge based on the fact that Dr. Salekin actually examined Employee.  The court also 
relied on Employee’s lay testimony, which the court found credible.  The court gave no
weight to Dr. Johnson’s responses to Employer’s questionnaire in light of his statements 
that evaluation and treatment of headaches were beyond the scope of his expertise.  
Employer has appealed.
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the 
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.  
4See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2018).  When the trial judge has had the 
opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give 
considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court.  Madden v. Holland 
Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009).  However, “[n]o similar 
deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.”  
Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at 
*6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018).  Similarly, the interpretation and 
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with 
no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions.  See Mansell v. 
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013).  We are 
also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, 
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a 
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2018).
Analysis
A.
Employer first asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Salekin’s C-32 into 
evidence.  Employer argues that Employee gave inadequate notice of his intent to use the 
C-32 as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235(c)(2), that the C-32 was 
deficient because it failed to include all the information required by section 50-6-
235(c)(1), and that the court failed to make findings establishing good cause for excusing 
Employee’s failure to file medical records prior to the hearing.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235(c)(1) states that “[a]ny party may 
introduce direct testimony from a physician through a written medical report on a form 
established by the administrator. . . . Any written medical report sought to be introduced 
into evidence shall include within the body of the report or as an attachment a statement 
of the qualifications of the person making the report.”  Furthermore, the report “shall be 
admissible at any stage of a workers’ compensation claim in lieu of a deposition upon 
oral examination, if notice of intent to use the sworn statement is provided to the 
opposing party or counsel not less than twenty (20) days before the date of intended use.”  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-235(c)(2) (2018).
With respect to Employer’s argument that it did not receive adequate notice of 
Employee’s intent to use Dr. Salekin’s C-32, the court found that Employee’s indication
on his request for expedited hearing that Dr. Salekin would appear “via C-32” was 
sufficient to put Employer on notice that Employee intended to rely on the document.  
We agree.
5Also without merit is Employer’s argument that the C-32 is deficient and therefore 
inadmissible.  Because Employee failed to file any medical records in the trial court, 
including Dr. Salekin’s C-32, Employer made the decision to file the records of 
Employee’s treatment, as well as Dr. Salekin’s C-32, noting in its brief on appeal that 
“Employer did not file Dr. Salekin’s curriculum vitae.”  However, we conclude 
Employer cannot now complain that the document should have been excluded for its 
deficiencies when those deficiencies were the result of Employer’s determination of 
which records to file and its indication that it would rely on “[a]ny and all documents and 
pleadings filed . . . along with attachments or exhibits to those documents and pleadings.”
Moreover, other than asserting that it did not receive adequate notice of Employee’s 
intent to use Dr. Salekin’s Form C-32 at the expedited hearing, Employer did not raise 
any issue in the trial court concerning whether the Form C-32 met the statutory 
requirements. Such issues are therefore waived.
Employer also takes issue with Employee’s failure to file any medical records with 
the trial court in support of his request for benefits, as well as the trial court’s lack of 
findings establishing good cause for Employee’s failure to file any records. The trial 
court cautioned Employee that not submitting medical records or other documentation to 
support a request for benefits was not good practice, and we agree.1 While it is true that 
Employee failed to file any documentation other than his own affidavit to support his 
claim, Employer elected to file Employee’s medical records.2 Thus, the record contains 
Employee’s treatment records and Dr. Salekin’s report and C-32, and these records 
provide an adequate basis for the trial court’s decision.
In short, there is no dispute that Employer objected to the admission of Dr. 
Salekin’s C-32 (which it filed) and notified the court and Employee of its intent to depose 
Dr. Salekin.  Moreover, we recognize Employer’s argument that, between the time it 
became aware of Employee’s intent to rely on Dr. Salekin’s C-32 and the expedited 
hearing, it was not feasible to schedule Dr. Salekin’s deposition.  However, Employer did 
not seek a continuance to be allowed the opportunity to depose Dr. Salekin.  Rather, 
Employer filed the C-32 and Employee’s medical records and proceeded with the 
expedited hearing.  Issues regarding the admissibility of expert testimony are left to the 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless the trial court abused its 
discretion.  Bogle v. Nighthawk Radiology Servs., LLC, No. M2014-01933-COA-R3-CV, 
2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2016).  We find no abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances presented.
1 We also note that Employee has failed to file a brief on appeal as required by Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 
0800-02-22-.02(2) (2018).
2 Even assuming the trial court had excluded the Form C-32, Dr. Salekin’s April 28, 2019 report was 
admissible for purposes of the expedited hearing pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-
.16(6)(b) (2018).  In that report, Dr. Salekin opined that Employee suffered from “post-traumatic 
headaches as a complication of closed head injury sustained during the incident at work on 4-25-18.”
6B.
Employer’s remaining issues may be restated as whether the trial court erred in 
finding Employee will likely prevail at trial in establishing his entitlement to a panel of 
neurologists.  Employer asserts that the trial court erred in its evaluation of the medical 
proof because it failed to conduct a thorough analysis of the factors set out in Bass v. The 
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 2016-06-1038, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 36 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 26, 2017).  In that case, we stated that when faced 
with contradictory expert medical opinions, “the trial judge must obviously choose which 
view to believe.  In doing so, [the trial judge] is allowed, among other things, to consider 
the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their examination, the information 
available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information by other 
experts.”  Id. at *9 (citing Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 
1991)).  Because the trial court did not set out a detailed analysis of each of these factors, 
Employer argues the court abused its discretion in determining which medical expert’s 
opinion to accept.  We disagree.
While the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Orman and adopted by us in 
Bass are relevant factors to consider, a trial court need not engage in a detailed analysis 
of each factor prior to reaching its decision.  Here, the court gave little weight to Dr. 
Johnson’s opinion based on his previously expressed lack of qualifications with respect to 
evaluating and treating headaches.  The court then considered the opinions of Dr. Hauge 
and Dr. Salekin and concluded that, viewed in the context of Employee’s testimony, 
which the court found credible, Dr. Salekin’s opinion was the more persuasive.  We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Employer also points out that, to the extent Dr. Johnson’s recommendation that 
Employee “see someone” is a referral, it is vague and does not identify the specialty of 
the physician Employee should see.  Employer asserts that, in ordering it to provide a 
panel of neurologists, the trial court inappropriately exercised medical judgment.  
However, Employer does not assert that another specialty is more appropriate or that 
neurology is in some way inappropriate.  We conclude that the evidence does not 
preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that Employee is likely to prevail at a 
hearing on the merits in establishing his entitlement to a panel of neurologists.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the 
case. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.
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